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GLASS BEFORE ITS TIME, PREMATURE IRON:
THE UNFORSEEABLE FUTURES OF TECHNOLOGY IN
BENJAMIN’S ARCADES PROJECT
Graham MacPhee
Only now are we beginning to guess what forms - and they will be
determinative for our epoch - lie hidden in machines.
Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project
HISTORICAL OPTICS
Walter Benjamin’s significance within English speaking cultural criticism is
usually located in his anticipation of two central tendencies - namely the
contemporary concern for the unprecedented impact of technology, and
our pervasive scepticism towards notions of progress and historical continuity.
Yet if this is true, Benjamin’s prescience is judged rather differently in each
case. His rejection of a progressive temporal framework is widely regarded
as an expansive conceptual move, a liberating theoretical act that enriches
historical interpretation by restoring to it a concern for questions of absence,
memory, and differential return. On the other hand, Benjamin’s
consideration of technology - associated primarily with the question of image
reproduction - is seen as an important precursor of contemporary
approaches, but one that is fundamentally limited, and which has been
superseded by subsequent theoretical developments: although marking a
step in the right direction, it has quickly come to be regarded as out of date.
This divergent reception-history is registered in the fate of Benjamin’s
conceptual vocabulary. Expressions drawn from Benjamin’s temporal lexicon
- such as ‘after-life’, ‘ruin’, ‘mourning’, ‘homogenous time’, and ‘convoluted
temporality’ - have achieved a widespread currency, even where Benjamin’s
name is not directly mentioned. In contrast, Benjamin’s visual terminology
has proven much less successful. In contemporary discussions of visual
culture, the language of the ‘spectacle’ and the ‘simulacrum’ tends to
predominate, and where Benjamin’s thinking is invoked it is quickly
translated into these terms without much comment or reflection. This
unhappy fate is manifested in the pre-eminence of the term ‘aura’, whose
‘loss’ - once isolated from the wider conceptual matrix of Benjamin’s thinking
- can be assimilated to contemporary narratives of the shift from ‘depth’ to
‘surface’ and the consequent claim for ‘the loss of the real’. However, such a
reduced conception of Benjamin’s understanding of technological
appearance strips it of its temporal dynamic, resulting - ironically enough in the familiar claim that his analysis of photography and film exhibits a
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naïve faith in technological progress. Thus, the very theoretical failure which
Benjamin is routinely praised for avoiding at one level is ascribed to him at
another.
The aim of this essay is not so much to refute this reading, as to grasp its
elisions, ironies and misrecognitions as an interpretative opportunity that
points beyond it. As Benjamin argues in ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’ (1922),
‘the interpretation of what is striking and curious’ in a work’s receptionhistory ‘becomes a prerequisite for any later critic’, a contention that is just
as relevant to the after-life of Benjamin’s text as it is to that of Goethe.1 The
retrospective construction of Benjamin sketched above implies a number of
suppressions and oppositions: philosophically, it involves the suppression
of Benjamin’s engagement with Kant; methodologically, it misrecognises
the dual role of the visual as both ‘material’ and ‘method’ in Benjamin’s
work; conceptually, it requires the separation of Benjamin’s thinking of
technology from his thinking of time; and textually, it assumes an untenable
distinction between certain texts which are seen to focus exclusively on the
philosophy of history and the temporality of interpretation - such as the
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to the Trauerspiel study (1928),2 Convolute N
of The Arcades Project,3 and ‘On the Concept of History’ (1940)4 - and those
which are seen as centring on the analysis of technology - such as One Way
Street (1928),5 ‘Little History of Photography’ (1931),6 and most famously
‘The Work of Art in the Epoch of its Technical Reproducibility’ (1935/6).7
This essay argues that rather than implying a progressive linear drive,
Benjamin’s analysis of technology is inextricably bound up with the conception
of convoluted time developed in his philosophy of history. Further, it argues
that the point of intersection between technology and time in Benjamin’s
thinking lies in his consideration of visual experience. This essay explores
Benjamin’s triangulation of technology, time and vision by tracing the complex
relationship between two texts that have become central to Benjamin’s reception
in the anglophone academy, but which remain to be adequately understood
together - the seminal essay on technology, ‘The Work of Art in the Epoch of its
Technical Reproducibility’, and the voluminous and unfinished collection of
notes and drafts that constitutes The Arcades Project. Benjamin laboured on The
Arcades Project throughout the 1930s and was himself clear about its significance
for the broader spectrum of his thinking, describing it to Gershom Scholem in
1930 as ‘the theatre of all my conflicts and all my ideas’.8 However, the
relationship between the ‘Work of Art’ essay and this larger project is not
straightforward: as Benjamin explained in a letter to Werner Kraft, although
the Work of Art essay ‘bears no relationship [to The Arcades Project] in terms of
content, …. [m]ethodologically, however, it is most intimately related to it’.9
Visual motifs permeate Benjamin’s interminable research into nineteenth
century Paris, from the gazing flaneur to the prostitute as object of the gaze,
and from the rows of dazzling commodities that line the new plate windows of
the department stores to the dioramas, boulevards, picture puzzles, and
yellowing hand-bills that swell the thirty six convolutes. And of course, the
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visual is key to Benjamin’s consideration of the arcades - those transitional
visual environments which exploit the light of day through their traceries of
glass and iron, while at night basking in the artificial glow of the new gas light.
But crucially, the visual also figures as the methodological principle or strategy
that underlies the mass of material, a principle that Benjamin describes in
terms of ‘montage’, ‘allegory’, ‘the image at a standstill’, and the ‘dialectical
image’, terms that echo the practices of visual art, photography and film. This
dual role - as material and method - points to the temporal complexity of
Benjamin’s understanding of technological appearance.
The inextricability of method and material emerges most powerfully in
the figure of the arcades themselves. Their significance lay in the fact of their
peculiar untimeliness: mostly dating from the first half of the century, for
Benjamin they presented an image of ‘glass before its time, premature iron’.
The arcades anticipated the technological matrix of the twentieth century
city, which would exploit glass and steel to produce new forms of construction
and thus new contexts for the organisation of social, political, economic and
cultural life. And yet the arcades had not been historically successful:
In the arcades, both the most brittle and the strongest materials suffered
breakage; in a certain sense, they were deflowered. Around the middle
of the past century, it was not yet known how to build with glass and
iron. Hence, the light that fell from above, through the panes between
the iron supports, was dirty and sad.10

10. AP, F1, 2.

11. AP, F3, 2.

Once commercial activity migrated to the department stores, whose more
businesslike exploitation of iron and glass was able to organise desire more
efficiently around the rhythms of commodity production, the arcades quickly
became the overlooked refuge of forgotten and unwanted objects. But for
Benjamin, the momentary emergence of unforeseeable futures is latent in
precisely such sites, where the visible ‘molders under spurious constructions:
glass before its time, premature iron’.11
Without a recognition of the temporal complexity of Benjamin’s
conception of visual experience, his discussion of technology risks being
separated from his thinking of time, and so mistaken for an uncritical
enthusiasm for machines or even a species of technological determinism.
The aim of this essay is to trace something of the complex relationship
between technology, time and vision in Benjamin’s work by reading together
the Work of Art essay and The Arcades Project. In doing so it seeks to illuminate
the political orientation of Benjamin’s analysis of technology by examining
its embeddedness in the increasingly violent scene of modern politics.
REINVENTING VISION
Technology’s reorganisation of the visual has played such an important role
in defining our contemporary cultural condition that it is easy to feel familiar
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with the conceptual topos of Benjamin’s account of image reproduction,
even if unacquainted with its broader philosophical, theological or political
commitments. However, such a comfortable sense of familiarity is likely to
be misleading, since most contemporary accounts of technologicallymediated visual culture take their bearings from very different intellectual
co-ordinates.
Contemporary discussion tends to identify the impact of technology on
visual experience in terms of a shift from ‘surface’ to ‘depth’, a shift that is
understood as constituting ‘the loss of the real’. In effect, such an approach
views our visual condition as an inversion of the Cartesian paradigm of
vision.12 For Descartes, the prior correspondence between rational form
and the realm of extended substance allows the perceiving subject to see
through illusory appearance and grasp the world that lies behind. For theorists
such as Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio and Frederic Jameson,
contemporary technology severs any such connection by granting autonomy
to appearances, emptying visual experience of access to the substantial world
of ‘the real’ and leaving the perceiving subject overwhelmed and
disorientated. In contrast, Benjamin’s understanding of vision seeks to
radicalise Kant’s concept of experience, rather than returning to the preKantian opposition of ‘the illusory’ and ‘the real’. For Kant, appearance
(Erscheinung) is not illusion (Schein), since appearances are not arbitrary
and formless, but are already organised in terms of the forms of intuition space and time. Consequently, knowledge is limited to the realm of spatiotemporal appearance, rather than being projected into a ‘real’ that lies
beyond it. Kant’s valorisation of appearance over and against an unseen
absolute marks a profound break with the Platonic and Christian
subordination of experience to an otherworldly truth.13 As such it reveals as
dogmatic the Cartesian appeal to a prior configuration of form which is to
ground certainty, with its restricted opposition between the illusory and
‘the real’. Or to put it more bluntly, in Kant there is no ‘real’ in the first
place which might subsequently be ‘lost’.
However, if Benjamin draws on Kant in rethinking visual experience,
his approach is not just another call for a move ‘back to Kant’. Rather, as
Howard Caygill argues, Benjamin’s project involves ‘recasting’ the
transcendental philosophy in order to overcome its perceived limitations.14
In ‘On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy’ (1918), Benjamin argues
that the problem with Kant’s concept of experience is that it suffers a double
restriction which fixes the co-ordinates of space and time: first, because it is
limited within the paradigm of subject and object, and second because it is
patterned on empirical human consciousness.15 In developing his own
approach to vision, Benjamin describes a different conception of the nature
of spatio-temporal experience. 16 Like Kant, Benjamin understands
phenomenal objects to occur as already spatially and temporally organised;
but unlike Kant, their organisation is not limited to the forms of human
intuition, and nor is human intuition itself conceived of as fixed, but is
THE
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understood as historically variable. Consequently, objects are seen to encode
different modes of experience, while the parameters of human perception
through which they are apprehended change over time. In being seen,
therefore, the spatio-temporal configuration of the object is apprehended
through a heterogeneous structuring of experience. Vision is no longer to
be thought of as the static confrontation between the interiority of a selfpossessed subject and a world of exteriority, but occurs as the overlay of
different configurations of space and time within which variable patterns of
similarity, difference and resonance may arise.
The implications of this conceptual shift are far-reaching. Rather than
inhabiting a fully present moment of apprehension, vision is seen to involve
the interplay of non-synchronous configurations of experience. In these
terms, visual experience cannot be reduced to the conscious intention of a
subject, since visual echoes may jump out at the eye and give rise to
unexpected associations of memory and meaning - or what Benjamin calls
‘non-sensuous similarities’.17 Further, the patterns of resonance, relation or
difference that emerge in perception are not ordered around a static
transcendental configuration or ‘canon’. That is, the parameters of visibility
are not fixed around the clarity, coherence and harmony of a single
organisation of form, but themselves emerge in the interplay between
different configurations of experience, as much in blurring and dissonance
as in relation and resemblance. Benjamin’s philosophical reinvention of
vision, then, involves rethinking the very parameters of experience, and
therefore implies a reconceptualisation of the relationship between the
transcendental and the phenomenal.
With this in mind, the distance between Benjamin’s conception of visual
experience and contemporary accounts of ‘the loss of the real’ becomes
clear. Where such accounts claim that technological appearances are illusory
and empty, Benjamin understands visual experience as being imbued with
a variable potential or charge - although the realm of experience is no
longer to be considered simply as the scene of Kantian knowledge, and still
less as an opportunity for grasping ‘the real’. Attempts to read Benjamin’s
diagnosis of the ‘decay of aura’ in terms of ‘the loss of the real’ ignore this
important conceptual difference, and as a consequence they flatten out
significant aspects of Benjamin’s visual lexicon. While accounts of the loss
of ‘the real’ narrate the inability of vision to access a world of substances
‘behind’ illusory appearance - hence the shift from ‘depth’ to ‘surface’ such a conceptual framework makes no sense for Benjamin, who envisages
the decay of aura not in terms of surface and depth, but in terms of nearness
and distance. Benjamin’s terms ‘near-sight’ (Nahsicht) and ‘far-sight’ (Fernsicht),
borrowed from the Viennese art-historian Alois Reigl, describe the variability
of the transcendental organisation of experience, and have nothing to do
with the notion of seeing ‘through’ illusory appearance to ‘a real’ that might
lie beyond.
The concepts of near-sight and far-sight that underlie Benjamin’s account
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of vision in both The Arcades Project and the Work of Art essay developed out
of his analysis of the historical emergence of modernity in the Trauerspiel
study (1928). In Benjamin’s hands the terms were used to elaborate the
historicity of the very structuring of apperception, an approach which not
only implies the historical variability of perception, but also ascribes an
unprecedented temporal complexity to experience. Central to this
understanding of perception and apperception - and by extension to the
new conception of experience which they imply - was the historical
reformulation of what in English-speaking criticism we refer to as
‘technology’, but what Benjamin called ‘Technik’.
Technik and temporality
Underlying Benjamin’s reinvention of vision lies a broader
reconceptualisation of experience that allows him to avoid the oppositions
of interiority and exteriority - or ‘technique’ and ‘technology’ - which more
recent positions often imply. As Julian Roberts has pointed out, Benjamin
does this by exploiting the ambiguity of the German word Technik, whose
meaning includes two distinct senses which in English are expressed by the
terms ‘technology’ and ‘technique’ respectively. Thus, as Roberts observes,
‘a piece of machinery is Technik, and so are the methods and organisations
used to exploit it’.18 According to Howard Caygill, this extended usage is
designed to overcome the traditional opposition between the ‘spiritual’ and
the ‘material’ by conceiving of Technik ‘as a medium of organisation which
pattern[s] experience while being reciprocally subject to change in the face
of experience’.19 As a way of describing the organisation of experience, Technik
not only designates an apparatus like the camera or ‘visual technics’ such as
drawing or painting, but also pre-modern ways of relating to nature such as
ritual or magic.
Benjamin’s new concept of Technik therefore marks a considerable
extension of what we normally think of as ‘technology’, a point that is made
clear in the first and second versions of the Work of Art essay, but which is
elided in the third version. Thus, in the second version of the essay Benjamin
describes both film and magic as forms of Technik, in that they each constitute
a particular way of organising the relationship between humanity and the
phenomenal world. However, if both are designated as instances of
‘technology’, the essay insists on a radical difference between them, a
difference reflected terminologically in the distinction between what is called
the ‘first technology’ of myth and magic, and the ‘second technology’ of
modernity. This distinction is elaborated through their anticipated
tendencies: ‘The achievements of the first technology’, Benjamin writes,
‘might be said to culminate in human sacrifice; those of the second, in the
remote-controlled aircraft which needs no human crew’.20 At first sight the
point of this comparison may seem obscure, but in fact the distinction that
Benjamin draws here is precise and consistent, and depends not on a
THE
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rhetorical opposition between custom and machinery but on the difference
between two modes of temporality.
Benjamin locates the condition of possibility of these different
temporalities in the historically variable relation between technology and
the phenomenal world, or ‘nature’. Magic emerged as a response to ‘the
requirements of a society whose technology existed only in fusion with ritual’
- that is, a technology that was tied to the repetition of natural forms in order
to master and control them. Consequently, ‘the results of [this] first
technology [appear as] valid once and for all’ since ‘it deals with irreparable
lapse or sacrificial death, which holds good for eternity’; that is, first
technology remains tied to the configuration of space and time given by a
nature that appears fixed and eternal. In contrast, the second technology
of modernity emerges ‘when human beings first began to distance themselves
from nature’, a distance that Benjamin understands as the freedom from
the reproduction of natural forms, or from the givenness of spatio-temporal
configuration.21 As such, the central feature of this second technology is not
reproduction but invention, or what Benjamin terms ‘play’. For Benjamin, play
implies a different mode of temporality since ‘it operates by means of
experiments and endlessly varied test procedures’, and so its results ‘are
wholly provisional’.22 Thus, the historical development of technology involves
a fundamental reformulation of the transcendental structure of experience,
which marks a shift from the static spatio-temporal framework of myth to a
new condition characterised by the mutability of space and time.
Contra accounts of the spectacle and the simulacrum, according to
Benjamin we miss the historical specificity of modern technology if we
privilege technological reproduction at the expense of the new element of
‘play’ contained within it. But we also miss the different political possibilities
which are opened up by this new spatio-temporal condition. Benjamin argues
that ‘the first technology really sought to master nature’ because it lacked
its inventive or productive power, and so in a sense always remained
subordinate to it. However, the unprecedented productive potential of the
second technology means that such an imperative to domination is no longer
necessary, in the sense that it has become practically possible to envisage a
reciprocal ‘interplay between nature and humanity’. Yet if this possibility is
made practicable in modern technology, that is not to say that it will be
actualised. On the contrary, as Benjamin notes, in fact we persist in ‘viewing
the second technology in terms of the first’ - that is, we persist in ‘describ[ing]
the goal of the second technology as “mastery over nature”’.23
The distinction between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ technology may seem to
imply a progressive scheme, but in fact Benjamin deploys the terms in a
way that allows him to avoid viewing the development of technology in
terms of progress. In order to register the extraordinary impact of modern
technology, cultural criticism has stressed its unprecedented nature - but as
a result it becomes difficult to see the newness of technology in terms other
than some sort of linear progression, whether ostensibly regretted or
80
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celebrated. Benjamin seeks to circumvent this problem by deploying the
vocabulary of ‘first’ and ‘second’ technology not sequentially but simultaneously:
that is, while the second technology of modernity opens up new possibilities
for the reinvention of the relationship between social existence and the
phenomenal world, it remains bound within the political and social
organisations inherited from the first technology. From this perspective,
the temporal condition of modern technology is radically heterogeneous,
since paradoxically it involves both an unprecedented newness and the return
of the past. For Benjamin, then, the development of technology is not to be
understood as a linear ascent, but as the simultaneous emergence and folding
back of different historical possibilities. But as such, technology marks a
violently unstable disjunction that runs through the political and social fabric
of modernity.
Benjamin’s understanding of this disjunction was informed by the events
of the First World War, which provides a crucial context both for the Arcades
Project and for his writing on art and technical reproducibility through the
1930s. For Benjamin, the War manifested the violent consequences of
nineteenth-century Europe’s failure to come to terms with the space and
time of global technology. Instead of responding to the new organisation of
the phenomenal world, Europe sought refuge in the spatial integrity and
temporal self-identity of the nation-state. In ‘The Storyteller’ (1936),
Benjamin writes that ‘with the World War a process began to become
apparent which has not halted since’:
For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than
strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation,
bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in
power. A generation that had gone to school on the horse-drawn streetcar
now stood under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained
unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force
of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body.24
In his review essay of 1930, ‘Theories of German Fascism’, Benjamin
describes the war in terms that deliberately invoke Nietzsche’s Genealogy of
Morality - as ‘the slave revolt of technology’; that is, as the upsurge of a new
configuration of space and time that can no longer be bound within the
parameters of the nation-state.25 The attempt by the contemporary mass
movement of fascism to re-impose the inherited co-ordinates of experience,
and so subordinate the phenomenal world as ‘nature’, is understood by
Benjamin as creating the conditions for an unprecedented upsurge of
violence. ‘In the parallelogram of forces formed by these two - nature and
nation’, Benjamin observes, ‘war is the diagonal’.26 The essay argues that if
Europe fails to recognise the new conditions of global society - or what it
terms ‘technology’s right of co-determination in the social order’ - then
‘millions of human bodies will indeed … be chopped to pieces and chewed
THE
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up by iron and gas’.27
Far from seeing an unalloyed prospect for progress, Benjamin’s concept
of Technik articulates the violent disparity between the technological
reorganisation of the phenomenal world and the inherited configurations
of human value and meaning. For Benjamin, the unprecedented
reformulation of space and time that Marx had identified in the Grundrisse
and Capital had not been met with corresponding changes in the modes of
organisation of social experience - or the social, political and legal ‘technics’
of the modern nation-state. Thus, while the phenomenal world was being
reorganised according to new rhythms of acceleration and configurations
of spatial porosity, the political and social structures of right, possession,
belonging and exclusion remained rigidly bound to an organisation of space
and time modelled on the self-identity of an integral and enduring Being.
As a consequence, the inherited values that articulate the legitimacy of these
technics appear increasingly arbitrary and meaningless. The conflict within
Technik therefore gives rise to a nihilistic condition within which the attempt
to reaffirm traditional social and political forms becomes one increasingly
violent option. Benjamin’s concept of Technik, then, is not an expression of
technocratic optimism, but an attempt to map the violent consequences of
the failure of modern politics to address the reorganisation of the
phenomenal world in technology.
THE DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD
If it is a mistake to think of Benjamin’s account of Technik as naïvely optimistic,
then it is equally misleading to think of it in terms of a pessimistic
technological determinism. Indeed, the urgency of Benjamin’s claim on
our attention lies in his rejection of the inverted Cartesianism which locks
recent accounts of technological appearance into dystopian scenarios of
total control and political passivity. Instead of rendering experience inert either by fusing the Cartesian polarity of subject and object, or positing
their absolute separation - Benjamin’s reinvention of vision develops an
alternative paradigm that allows for a differential return within visual
experience. Or to put it in terms of the conflict between technology and
technique: instead of either subordinating a notion of the ‘properly human’
technique of perception to technology, or positing their absolute
incommensurability, Benjamin looked to technology itself as the ‘schema’
or matrix that would reinvent the very terms of this relation. From this
perspective, the Work of Art essay is less about reproduction - or repetition
with a fixed spatio-temporal framework - than reproducibility - or the
reinvention of the co-ordinates of space and time in each moment of
‘repetition’.
In rejecting the paradigms of progress and decline, Benjamin sought to
elaborate an approach that would register the myriad range of possibilities
latent in the contemporary condition of technology. To this end, his writing
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of the 1930s developed his earlier account of vision and its vocabulary of
‘nearness’ and ‘distance’ in the light of the Trauerspiel study and the highly
inventive, but now largely neglected text, One Way Street. In the burgeoning
pages of The Arcades Project - and especially in the notes and drafts associated
with the abortive Baudelaire book such as ‘Central Park’ (1938/9) and ‘Some
Motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939) - Benjamin articulated his engagement with
technology through the dynamic and temporally sensitive conceptual pairing
of ‘allegory’ and ‘aura’.28 However, the tendency within contemporary
cultural criticism has been to isolate the term ‘aura’, and the discussion of
‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ associated with it, from the broader
framework of Benjamin’s concept of experience. Not only does this kind of
reading tend to obscure the essay’s own critique of ‘authenticity’, but it also
implies a straightforward historical progression from a pre-modern
‘authenticity’ to the modern condition of ‘inauthenticity’.29 This progression
is then mapped onto contemporary accounts of the shift from ‘depth’ to
‘surface’, so enabling the ‘loss of aura’ to be assimilated to the familiar
claim for ‘the loss of the real’. In fact, Benjamin’s terms ‘allegory’ and ‘aura’
are primarily concerned with the question of temporality, and not with the
‘spatial’ problematic of grasping a ‘real’ that lies behind or beneath the
illusory surface of technological appearance. Indeed, far from marking a
linear historical progression from the pre-modern to the modern, the terms
were designed to register the paradoxical return of the archaic within
modernity.
To understand Benjamin’s dynamic deployment of the terms ‘allegory’
and ‘aura’ it is necessary first of all to recall their location within the historical
emergence of modernity understood as ‘the decay of experience [Erfahrung]’.
Rather than being viewed as a synonym for the ‘loss of the real’, Benjamin’s
conception of ‘the decay of experience’ is best understood in terms of Max
Weber’s influential account of ‘the disenchantment of the world’.30 According
to Weber, both the development of modern subjectivity and the emergence
of the scientific world-view are to be grasped as aspects of the withdrawal of
divine meaningfulness from the world of appearance. This complex historical
process informs the Trauerspiel study, which seeks to explore the historical
reformulation of experience in early modern Europe through Weber’s
insight. In Benjamin’s terms, once creation is seen as bereft of intrinsic
significance or connection, the soul withdraws into the spiritual inwardness
of Protestantism, a conjunction described in the Trauerspiel study as ‘the
triumph of subjectivity and the onset of an arbitrary rule over things’.31
This condition provides the basis for the emergence of the hybrid visual
and literary form of allegory, which images the new, dynamic relationship
between appearance and meaning. Allegory assumes such an important
role for Benjamin because it marks the emergence of a new relationship
between word and image - or in Kantian terms, the emergence of a new
condition for the schematism of concept and intuition. Thus it implies a
reformulation of the transcendental conditions of experience, which in turn
THE
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suggests different possible modes of ordering the relationship between the
transcendental and spatio-temporal experience.
Benjamin developed his language of nearness and distance in order to
describe these possibilities. Within the terms of Weber’s conception of the
disenchantment of the world, the emergence of allegory signals the collapse
of the residual mythic worldview of medieval Christianity, whose eternal
categories of meaning and value transcend the human experience of space
and time. That is, allegory generates the framework of interpretation from
within the contingency of spatio-temporal experience - or in Benjamin’s terms, it
bring things ‘closer’.32 For Benjamin, however, the emergence of such a
‘near-sight’ points in a number of different directions. At one level, allegory
engenders a temporal dynamism, since the categories of interpretation are
not given once and for all, but emerge from the flux of spatio-temporal
experience. At another level, the very contingency of allegory threatens to
slide into incoherence, since it becomes difficult to extract a framework of
meaning from the flux that would persist beyond the instant of recognition.
In the closing pages of the Trauerspiel study this radical instability is shown
to generate a powerful tendency towards reversal or ‘resurrection’, although
Benjamin’s description of the nature of such reversal is deliberately left
open.33 Such a ‘resurrection’ might take the form of an unexpected yield or
productivity within the disconsolate panorama of the visible; but equally, it
might be manifested as the desire for a return to the stability of myth through
a violent reaffirmation of the authority of tradition.
In his study of nineteenth century Paris, Benjamin pursues the historical
consequences of the disenchantment of the world by mapping the range of
social, cultural and political responses to the new spatio-temporal condition.
Where the contingency of things once merely characterised the Protestant
worldview, now it has been generalised by the Technik of modern industrial
production to become the very fabric of urban experience. It is in this sense
that Benjamin can declare that ‘allegory is the armature of the modern’,
and that in the nineteenth century ‘the commodity has taken the place of
the allegorical way of seeing’.34 But this is not to say that the situation of the
nineteenth century is the ‘same’ as that of the seventeenth century, for what
separates them is the new spatio-temporal dynamism of second technology.
As Benjamin observes at the opening of Convolute G, in pre-modern societies
the relatively slow rate of technological development could be assimilated
to the changing organisation of human experience. However, ‘the
transformation of things that set in around 1800’ now ‘dictate[s] the tempo’
of change, a tempo that becomes increasing ‘breathtaking’. ‘Finally’,
Benjamin observes, ‘we arrive at the present state of things’, where ‘the
possibility now arises’ that human experience ‘will no longer find time to
adapt … to technological processes’.35
As we have seen, for Benjamin the transitivity of space and time in
modern technology demands a reciprocal transitivity in the organisation of
social, political, economic and cultural forms. But as became clear in his
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study of the nineteenth century, instead of matching this transitivity,
European societies increasingly sought to master the phenomenal world in
an unacknowledged repetition of the struggle waged by the first technology.
Benjamin describes this response in terms of ‘aura’, a term which designates
the withdrawal of the transcendental categories from the contingency of
the world, and the consequent fixing of the spatio-temporal parameters of
experience. While the collapse of the enchanted worldview of medieval
Christianity made possible the ‘near-sight’ of baroque allegory, it also
generates a counter-tendency by setting up an opposition between the
intense interiority of the Protestant soul and a creaturely world that appears
bereft of any sense of connection or inner necessity. The isolation of
subjectivity from the world makes possible the withdrawal or distancing of
the apperceptive frame from its imbrication within the contingency of
experience, a process which underlies the description of aura as ‘the unique
apparition of a distance, however close [the object] may be’.36 Just as
allegory’s immersion of the categories of interpretation within spatiotemporal experience marks them as contingent and fleeting, so conversely
this auratic ‘far-sight’ freezes them in an unchanging transcendental structure
which ‘turn[s] technically determined forms, that is, dependent variables,
into constants’.37 Benjamin therefore refers to aura as ‘a strange weave of
space and time’, because in the face of the unprecedented mutability of
space and time brought about by modern technology, auratic perception
fixes the transitivity of modern experience under the static gaze of a
mournful and isolated subject.38
In the Work of Art essay Benjamin develops this understanding of aura
through an account of the fate of the work of art in modern technology. As
is clear in the early versions of the essay, art demonstrates the convoluted
temporal condition of modern technology with particular clarity because it
involves both reproduction and invention, and so ‘is linked to both the first
and second technologies’.39 Just as the nineteenth-century understanding
of technology involved the superimposition of a viewpoint inherited from
the first technology onto the second, so the post-Romantic conception of
art involves the imposition of static perceptual parameters upon the dynamic
visual condition of urban modernity. However, as we have indicated, instead
of this choice being understood as a reflection of Benjamin’s concern with
the reformulation of the aesthetic in the Kantian sense - that is, with the
spatio-temporal co-ordinates of experience - it has been misread in terms
of a much more limited critique of the authenticity of the ‘aesthetic realm’.
Read in the context of Benjamin’s study of nineteenth century Paris, the
concept of aura that features so prominently in his analyses of contemporary
technology can be brought into relation with the ‘decay of experience’
signalled by the emergence of baroque allegory. The two terms ‘allegory’
and ‘aura’ must therefore be thought together - but equally, they must not
be treated as designating fixed entities or states. In fact, these two terms
were articulated together by Benjamin so as to name tendencies or vectors
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whose interaction might generate innumerable permutations. From this
perspective, these terms neither describe the forward march of technology
- from the ‘authenticity’ of aura to the ‘inauthenticity’ of allegory - nor a
vista of inevitable decline, but point to a range of different possible futures
latent in technology.
SEEING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
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If the complexity of Benjamin’s conception of the futures of technology has
become obscured in readings of the Work of Art essay, it is nonetheless
encoded in the very sprawling structure of The Arcades Project. Benjamin’s
arrangement of material was designed less as a fixed historical record, and
more as an attempt to rejuvenate contemporary thinking by unfreezing the
past. The myriad visual motifs that suffuse the study generate a dynamic
retrospective field within which the forgotten potentials of the past intersect
momentarily with the changing actuality of the present. A sense of this
broader ambition is suggested by the presentation of two nineteenth-century
‘image technologies’ which for Benjamin represent different possible
configurations of technology - the kaleidoscope and the picture puzzle. In
imaging the emergence of different possible futures in the marginal objects
of the past, this discussion indicates how Benjamin’s analysis sought to move
beyond the rigid framework of progress and decline.
The kaleidoscope, a popular parlour toy throughout most of the
nineteenth century, employs a rotating plane of coloured glass chips and
two fixed, intersecting mirrors to produce symmetrical patterns of coloured
light. In The Arcades Project it provides an image of one possible temporal
organisation of technology’s dynamic potential, in which first and second
technology are superimposed. For Benjamin, the kaleidoscope’s
transformation of the visible field into a constantly changing sequence of
coloured patterns figures the capacity of second technology to rearrange
the world of appearances; at the same time, however, the limits which it
places on this rearrangement also figure the persistence of the outlook of
first technology. For although these coloured patterns appear to dissolve
and recombine in inexhaustible permutations, in fact the parameters of
visual experience remain bound by a formal symmetry that remains the
same: as Benjamin points out, ‘with each turn [the kaleidoscope] collapses
everything ordered into a new order’.40 In this respect, the kaleidoscope
illustrates how the inventive potential of the second technology might be
simultaneously realised within and limited by the fixed perspective inherited
from the first technology. Thus for Benjamin, the kaleidoscope presents a
technical arrangement that restricts the futures of visual experience, for
although it allows for different patterns of arrangement or form, the
configuration which gives the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of form never
changes. And as such, the kaleidoscope images the technological basis of aura.
In Convolute J Benjamin describes an alternative temporal arrangement
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which he identifies with a different ‘image technology’, namely the printed
picture puzzles that could be found amongst the novelties and games sold
in the arcades during the nineteenth century. These picture puzzles were
composed of a melee of juxtaposed images and text arranged according to
different axes of orientation on the page. They challenged the viewer to
solve their riddle by trying out different combinations of cognitive
interpretation and visual recognition - such as word association, rhyming,
visual punning, or the recombinative logic of the anagram - in order to
discover the relationship between word and image. For Benjamin, such
puzzles constitute a different visual matrix to that of the kaleidoscope, one
which anticipates the captioned photograph, photomontage, film, and the
chaotic visual scene of the streets and arcades of the modern metropolis but which also looks back to allegory.
Benjamin frames his discussion of the picture puzzle in terms of Kantian
schematism, a context that suggests significant points of comparison with
his consideration of the kaleidoscope. Schematism refers to the process
underlying judgement, whereby the concepts derived from the table of
categories are brought into alignment with the manifold of intuition. For
Benjamin, the picture puzzle figures a relationship between word and image
- or concept and intuition - that recalls allegory in suggesting a new condition
for schematism. As he observes, in the disenchanted world of modernity
‘human knowledge … is something piecemeal … in an especially pregnant
sense: it is like the jumble of arbitrarily cut pieces from which a puzzle is
assembled’. As such the picture puzzle invites a particular approach that is
described in terms of the attitude adopted by the allegorist:
Through the disorderly fund which his knowledge places at his disposal,
the allegorist rummages here and there for a particular piece, holds it
next to some other piece, and tests to see if they fit together - that meaning
with this image or this image with that meaning. The result can never be
known beforehand, for there is no natural mediation between the two …
At no point is it written in the stars that the allegorist’s profundity will
lead it to one meaning rather than another. And though it may once
have acquired such a meaning, this can always be withdrawn in favour of
a different meaning.41
This passage offers an important contrast with Benjamin’s account of the
kaleidoscope. As we have seen, while the kaleidoscope images the dynamism
with which technology imbues appearance, it also images the fixed
perspective set up by the arrangement of glass, mirrors, tube and eyepiece.
In contrast, the attitude demanded by the picture puzzle is dynamic and
provisional, involving the perennial search for an appropriate configuration
of meaning that would match the constantly shifting spatio-temporal coordinates of appearance. In Benjamin’s hands, the image of the puzzle is
not allowed to resolve itself into the search for a final answer, since the
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alignment of word and image is itself forever changing, and so requires a
new ‘solution’ in each new context of appearing.
The contrast between kaleidoscope and picture puzzle emphasises the
different temporalities latent in technology by describing different modes
of schematising concept and intuition. In the kaleidoscope, the relationship
between visual experience and discursive meaning is fixed within a static
transcendental frame, in which the forms of intuition - space and time and the categorical structure of meaning are given. In the picture puzzle,
the frame itself emerges from the contingent juxtapositions of meaning
and image which occur in the distracted gaze of the allegorist, who ‘tests’
different meanings against ever new visual arrangements. Thus, while the
kaleidoscope offers a fixed response to the mutability of space and time in
modern experience, the picture puzzle responds with a temporal openness
that matches the transitivity of second technology.
This comparison provides a vital context for reading the Work of Art
essay, for it is precisely this conception of ‘testing’ that underlies its
account of the significance of film. In film, the essay argues, images are
not subordinated to a prior framework or canon of coherence and
meaning, but instead ‘the way each single image is understood [is]
prescribed by the sequence of all the preceding images’.42 Thus, the
spatio-temporal co-ordinates of formal relation and meaning are
themselves produced through the sequencing and interrelation of images,
rather than being a function of a fixed transcendental framework. Or, in
the vocabulary of nearness and distance, film immerses the apperceptive
frame within the contingent arrangement of appearances, rather than
imposing a static transcendental framework from without. The essay
illustrates this idea through an analogy between the film camera and the
surgeon: like the surgeon, the camera ‘penetrates deeply into [the] web’
of the phenomenal world, cutting it up into ‘manifold parts’ which ‘are
assembled under a new law’.43 In these terms, the law of visibility is not
fixed and established prior to experience, but is itself open to
renegotiation and reinvention in technology.
The central significance of film in the Work of Art essay lies in its capacity
to figure a different kind of response to the mutability of space and time in
technology. Instead of appealing to tradition or to a notion of the ‘properly
human’ to organise interpretation in the face of technological modernity,
the technology of film generates a perceptual matrix that can respond to
the porosity and transitivity of the phenomenal world without fixing it within
a static transcendental framework. Thus, rather than opposing the transitivity
of second technology with the fixed co-ordinates inherited from the first
technology, the temporal openness of film offers a response that is reciprocal.
Film therefore points to different political, social, and legal technics that
would, in the words of another essay, move ‘to correct the incapacity of
peoples to order their relationships to one another in accord with the
relationship they possess to nature through their technology’.44
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THE REAPPEARANCE OF POLITICS
Whether couched in terms of progress or decline, all varieties of
technological determinism involve the subordination of the political to
technology. In contrast, Benjamin’s concept of Technik envisages the
speculative non-identity of politics and technology, where technology
reinvents the very condition of the political, while the political discovers or
invents different possibilities in technology.45 And as this comparison
suggests, technological determinism not only subordinates politics, but also
suppresses the heterogeneity of technology. Benjamin’s concept of Technik,
on the other hand, was designed not only to articulate a political response
to technology, but also to illuminate the different political possibilities that
may be latent in technology.46
The tendency to read the Work of Art essay in isolation from the study
of Paris has obscured this more complex conception of the relationship
between technology and politics. Indeed, the ultimate arena for the
reciprocal interplay of politics and technology in The Arcades Project is the
city of Paris itself, and the study can be read as an exploration of the
reformulation of the polis in technology. It is the new condition of technology
that enables Baron Haussmann’s destruction of medieval Paris and his
rebuilding of the city - yet the structuring of social life that emerges from
this process in not simply an ineluctable function of technology, but is
decisively shaped by economic imperatives and political decisions.47 Thus,
while Haussmann’s project saw the destruction of the architectural fabric of
tradition, at the same time it sought to impose traditional structures of
authority and possession upon the transitivity and porosity of the modern
metropolis. It is this paradoxical return of the archaic in the modern that
Benjamin identifies in the monumentalism of Haussmann’s Paris. As
Benjamin observes, ‘Haussmann’s predilection for perspectives, for long
open vistas, represents an attempt to dictate art forms to technology’ - in
this case the ‘technology of city planning’.48
At the same time, however, technology’s recasting of the social and
economic fabric of the city through the nineteenth century also saw the
emergence of new and very different configurations of experience. The
arcades, which mostly predate Haussmann’s accession to the prefecture,
presented to Benjamin a particularly significant counterfactual to set against
the shape of the city that emerged from the process of Haussmannisation.
For while the new boulevards, parks and department stores functioned to
draw all the more firmly the traditional distinction between public and
private, the arcades fostered a spatio-temporal ambiguity which threatened
to dissolve such rigid social demarcations. That the arcades were unsuccessful
only added to their interest for Benjamin, since although some were
dismantled and demolished, most were preserved in varying states of
dilapidation and disrepair. For Benjamin, the ruined persistence of the
arcades within the new configuration of Paris attested to the heterogeneous
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character of modern experience. If the political correlate of the decay of
the arcades was the destruction of working-class communities and the
demobilisation of the bourgeoisie, the persistence of the arcades within the
fabric of Paris embodied the residues of a ‘dream world’, the memory of
different possible futures that continue to haunt the perceptual co-ordinates
of the present.
The convoluted temporality figured by the arcades illuminates the
temporal orientation of Benjamin’s discussion of film in the Work of Art
essay. Benjamin is well aware that while film points the way towards a
reciprocal relationship between humanity and technology, its capacity to
effect this reciprocity remains latent, since it is bound within inherited social,
political, and economic forms. Indeed, wherever the essay discusses the
current state of film it draws attention to the disparity between film’s
transformation of the conditions of social visibility, and the lack of any
corresponding reorganisation of the political and economic atomisation
that structures social life. Thus, as the essay makes clear, the new detachability
and transportability of the image subordinates the appearance of the social
world to the co-ordinates of private need and desire, but without a reciprocal
adjustment of the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ that organises
the space of politics. Paradoxically, then, the technological drive to ‘bring
things closer’ in fact functions to demarcate all the more firmly between the
aggregate of atomised individuals - as ‘the public’ - and those who appear
before them. As the essay observes, ‘this results in a new form of selection,
from which the champion, the star and the dictator emerge as victors’.49
There is, then, another sense in which the visual motifs of The Arcades
Project provide a vital context for reading Benjamin’s analysis of
contemporary technology. In The Arcades Project, Benjamin discovers
anticipations of the futures of technology not in the technological marvels
of the age which had been celebrated from the moment of their inception the steam locomotive, the telegraph, photography - but in the marginal
and the unsuccessful: not only in the arcades themselves but, as we have
seen, in such amusements and parlour games as the kaleidoscope and the
picture puzzle, which for a time packed the shop windows and display cases
of the arcades only to be discarded in favour of the latest novelty. This
preference for the marginal and the ephemeral was not a romantic
idiosyncrasy, since for Benjamin the measure of failure and success is not
an absolute, progressive scale but a temporal index: what is successful may
become outmoded once conditions change, and what was unsuccessful in
one context may become successful in another. If Benjamin looked to film
for an image of a different structuring of the space and time of experience,
his gaze was not focused exclusively on its present state, nor on the particular
future that this present implies. As well as the prospect presented willingly to
the contemporary viewer, Benjamin’s gaze also sought those possibilities
that remain latent and unrealised, yet which - like the arcades - image the
unforeseeable futures of technology.
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